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THE IMPROVED STANDARDS FOR LABORATORY 
ANIMALS ACT AND THE PROPOSED REGULATIONS: 
A GLIMMER OF HOPE IN THE BATTLE AGAINST 
ABUSIVE ANIMAL RESEARCH 
Robert J. Masonis* 
In the opinion of the [Animal Liberation Front], however, [the 
researcher] is another egghead engaged in redundant, costly, 
worthless research: another sadist torturing animals in the name 
of science .... "[The researcher has] been doing the same ex-
periment for fifteen years," the [ALF] members will be told at 
their briefing. "[The researcher has] been feeding infected mice 
brains by stomach tubes into the cats, and then he kills them or 
lets them die of vomiting, diarrhea, convulsions, and then he 
either uses their tissue for injection into other animals or dis-
poses of them . . . . " This is not exactly true. In fact, it is 
false .... To the [ALF], it doesn't matter. Human animals have 
no right to exploit non-human animals for any purpose whatso-
ever .... To the ALF, the world is an animal Auschwitz: the 
death toll is in the billions. 1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Few topics in contemporary society evoke more emotion than does 
the use of animals in biomedical research. The passage quoted above 
illustrates the fervency with which extremist animal rights groups, 
such as ALF, embrace their cause. Not all animal welfare organi-
zations are as militant or extreme in their beliefs as ALF. Many 
organizations seek only the prohibition of animal research where 
alternatives exist and the minimization of animal suffering when 
animal experimentation must be conducted. A substantial number 
* Articles Editor, 1988-89, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW. 
1 Mahurin & Sager, Inhuman Bondage (Animal Liberation Front), ROLLING STONE, March 
24, 1988, at 89 [hereinafter Inhuman Bondage] (quoting an anonymous ALF member). 
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of researchers, however, believe that extensive animal experimen-
tation regulation will cripple medical advancement. These research-
ers are convinced that animal experimentation is the key to remedy-
ing the many ailments that plague mankind. 2 Consequently, animal 
rights proponents often disagree with researchers over how much 
government regulation is necessary to preserve essential research 
while also ensuring that laboratory animals are treated humanely. 
The Animal Welfare Act (AWA or Act)3 is the primary federal 
statute regulating the care and treatment of animals intended for 
use in biomedical research and experimentation. The scarcity of 
federal case law4 addressing the use of laboratory animals in medical 
research under AW A's provisions does not reflect accurately the 
intensity of the controversy surrounding both the Act's substance 
and the United States Department of Agriculture's (USDA) enforce-
ment of AWA's provisions. 5 Both topics have received much attention 
from commentators over the past decade. 6 
2 "Every single major medical break-through in this century has involved animal experi-
mentation .... Measles, mumps, chicken-pox vaccines. Open-heart surgery. Virtually every 
single item that you can think of has been possible because we've been able to use animals." 
Id. at 176 (quoting Dr. Ronald Fayer, Director of the Animal Parasitology Institute). 
37 U.S.C. §§ 2131-2157 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). The Animal Welfare Act is the short title 
of the statute that was enacted in 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-544, 80 Stat. 350 (1966), and was 
amended in 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-579,84 Stat. 1560 (1970), 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-279, 90 Stat. 
417 (1976), and 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-198, 99 Stat. 1645 (1985). 7 U.S.C. § 2131 (1982). See 
infra notes 19-39 and 58-86 and accompanying text for a more detailed description of AWA 
and its evolution. 
4 International Primate Protection League v. Institute for Behavioral Research, 799 F.2d 
934 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S.Ct. 1624, reh'g denied, 107 S.Ct. 2492 (1987), is one of 
a few cases where a private party sought judicial review for violations of A WA provisions 
protecting laboratory animals. Yet, it is the only case where the merits of such a claim have 
been addressed fully. See supra note 142. 
5 Seven U.S.C. § 2143(a) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) authorizes the Secretary of Agriculture 
to promulgate regulations pursuant to AWA, which are codified at 9 C.F.R. § 1.1-167.10 
(1987). Chapter 7 U.S.C. § 2146(a) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) authorizes the Secretary of 
Agriculture to conduct periodic inspections to ensure A WA compliance. 
6 See, e.g., Dresser, Research on Animals: Values, Politics, and Regulatory Reform, 58 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 1147 (1985) (article suggests review processes should be created to enhance the 
statutory protection afforded to laboratory animals during experimentation); Dukes, The 
Improved Standards For Laboratory Animals Act: Will It Ensure That The Policy Of The 
Animal Welfare Act Becomes A Reality?, 31 ST. LOUIS U.L.J. 519 (1987) (article criticizes 
USDA's AWA enforcement effort and advocates passage of a statute authorizing citizen suits 
to compel USDA to enforce AWA); Rickleen, The Animal Welfare Act: Still a Crnelty to 
Animals, 7 ENVTL. AFF. 129 (1978) (USDA's enforcement effort has failed to provide animals 
the protections afforded them under AWA); Thomas, Antinomy: The Use, Rights, and Reg-
ulation of Laboratory Animals, 13 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 723, 752-53 (1986) [hereinafter 
Antinomy) (article argues that AWA should be replaced with new, comprehensive federal 
legislation affording laboratory animals adequate protection); Note, They Asked For Protection 
And They Got Policy: International Primates Mutilated Monkeys, 21 AKRON L. REV. 97 
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The passage of the Improved Standards for Laboratory Animals 
Act (ISLAA) in 1985 and the new regulations proposed by USDA 
pursuant to ISLAA (Proposed Rules),7 have fueled the battle be-
tween the medical research community seeking scientific autonomy8 
and animal welfare organizations seeking increased protection for 
laboratory animals used in experimentation. Since the passage of 
ISLAA, the statutory tide that once favored the research community 
at the expense of laboratory animal welfare9 has begun to ebb; 
laboratory animals are afforded greater protection, while the free-
dom of research facilities to regulate themselves has been curtailed. 10 
Despite the progress made under ISLAA toward striking a more 
egalitarian balance between the conflicting interests vying for leg-
islative attention,11 animal welfare organizations maintain a guarded 
optimism12 about the prospects for finalizing the USDA-proposed 
(1987) [hereinafter Mutilated Monkeys] (note criticizes the Fourth Circuit's decision in IPPL); 
Comment, Out From Under The Microscope: A Case For Laboratory Animal Rights, 2 DET. 
C.L. REV. 511 (1987) [hereinafter Out From Under The Microscope] (comment argues that 
the post-ISLAA AWA does not protect laboratory animals adequately from abusive research 
and proposes new, more stringent protective legislation); Comment, Creating a Private Cause 
of Action Against Abusive Animal Research, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 399, 404 (1986) [hereinafter 
Creating a Private Cause of Action] (comment argues that the failure of AWA to provide 
adequate protection for laboratory animals is attributable to the level of discretion afforded 
scientists under the Act and inadequate enforcement of AWA provisions); Note, Use of 
Animals in Medical Research: The Need for Governmental Regulation, 24 WAYNE L. REV. 
1733 (1978) [hereinafter Note, Use of Animals] (note argues that more pervasive regulation 
is needed to strike the proper balance between the needs of the research community and the 
care afforded laboratory animals). 
752 Fed. Reg. 10,292, 10,298 (1986) (to be codified at 9 C.F.R. Pts. 1 & 2) (proposed March 
31, 1987). 
8 Not all researchers are opposed to regulating the experimentation process. For example, 
during the congressional hearings on the proposed ISLAA legislation, H.R. 5725, a number 
of renowned members of the biomedical community expressed their support for the bill. 
Supporters included: Franklin M. Loew, Dean, School of Veterinary Medicine, Tufts Univer-
sity; Peter D. Wood, D.Sc., Ph.D., Professor of Medicine (Research), Stanford University 
Medical School Associate Director, Stanford Center for Research in Disease Prevention; and 
Herbert Rackow, M.D., Diplomate, American Board of Anesthesiology; Professor Emeritus, 
College of Physicians and Surgeons, Columbia University. Improved Standards for Laboratory 
Animals Act; and Enlorcement of the Animal Weljare Act by the Animal and Plant Health 
Inspection Se'rvice: Hearings on H.R, 5725 B~fore the Subcomm. on Department Operations, 
Research, and Foreign Agriculture, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984) [hereinafter ISLAA Hear-
ings]. 
9 Note, Use of Animals, supra note 6, at 1746; see also Antinomy, supra note 6, at 742-44 
(the pre-1985 AWA does not include freedom from pain nor does it prevent inefficient and 
unnecessary experimentation). 
10 See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 447, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1985 U.S. CODE CONGo 
& ADMIN. NEWS 2518, 2519. 
11 See infra note 213. 
12 Telephone interview with Christine Stevens, Secretary of the Society for Animal Protec-
tive Legislation, Washington D.C. (Sept. 30, 1987). 
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regulations to accompany ISLAA. Substantial pressure applied by 
researchers on USDA to develop less restrictive regulations has 
prompted this caution. 13 
This Comment analyzes the progress made by ISLAA toward 
expanding the protection afforded laboratory animals under A WA. 
In order to comprehend exactly what ISLAA has accomplished, it 
is first essential to understand what has transpired over the twenty-
two years since AWA was passed in 1966. 14 First, this Comment 
discusses AWA and its early amendments15 in light of their legislative 
histories. Second, this Comment focuses on ISLAA and the accom-
panying Proposed Rules, in particular the enforcement provisions. 
The reactions of both the research community (dissatisfaction) and 
the animal welfare community (enthusiasm) to the legislation and 
proposed regulations are also discussed. Finally, this Comment eval-
uates ISLAA's potential effectiveness in balancing the need to con-
tinue valuable biomedical research and the humane desire to avoid 
inflicting unnecessary pain on laboratory animals. 
II. THE ANIMAL WELFARE ACT: FORMATION AND EVOLUTION 
THROUGH THE 1976 AMENDMENTS 
A WA has undergone radical changes since its enactment. Origi-
nally established to prevent the theft of household pets,16 the Act 
now provides the necessary framework for regulating how labora-
tories treat research animals, even extending to the research pro-
13 Id.; see generally Comments of the National Association for Biomedical Research on 
Proposed Rules Regarding Definition of Terms and Animal Welfare Regulations (June 31, 
1987) (comments to proposed rules at 52 Fed. Reg. 10,292, 10,298 (March 31, 1987)) [herein-
after NABR Comments); Comments of the National Association for Biomedical Research on 
the Information Collection Provisions of the Proposed Rules Regarding Animal Welfare Reg-
ulations (June 31, 1987) (comments to proposed rules at 52 Fed. Reg. 10,298 (March 31, 1987)) 
[hereinafter NABR ICP Comments); see infra notes 104-25 and accompanying text for a 
more detailed discussion of these comments. 
In addition to the research community's opposition, it is evident that the President's Office 
of Management and Budget (OMB), which must approve the Proposed Rules before they can 
be finalized, is also dissatisfied with the Proposed Rules in their present form. A recent letter 
sent by OMB on August 12, 1988, to all federal agencies that use animals, indicates that OMB 
believes that compliance with the Proposed Rules would be too eostly. In the letter, OMB 
requests feedback from the agencies and specifically asks the agencies to consider whether 
the Proposed Rules should be reproposed in their entirety. Letter from the Society for Animal 
Protective Legislation (August 24, 1988). 
14 Act of August 24, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-544, 1966 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS (80 
Stat.) 400 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 2131-2157 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)). 
15 "Early amendments" refers to the 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-579, 84 Stat. 1560 (1970) and 
1976, Pub. L. No. 94-279, 90 Stat. 417 (1976) amendments to AWA. 
16 See infra notes 19-24 and accompanying text. 
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tocols themselves. 17 This development, however, has not proceeded 
evenly throughout the twenty-two year history of the Act. AWA 
regulation of research and experimentation involving animals was 
not established until the passage of ISLAA. Congress instituted this 
regulation to insure that animals do not suffer needlessly in the guise 
of scientific progress. 18 To grasp just how dramatic ISLAA's impact 
is on the Act's vitality, a brief overview of AW A's evolution is 
helpful. 
Prompted by the need to curb the illicit trade of stolen household 
pets for use in research facilities,19 Congress passed the Laboratory 
Animal Welfare Act (LAWA) in 1966.20 LAWA was designed to: 1) 
protect dog and cat owners from the theft of their pets for use in 
research facilities; 2) prevent the sale or use of stolen dogs and cats 
in research facilities; and 3) insure that certain animals receive hu-
mane care and treatment in research facilities. 21 To achieve those 
objectives, LAWA required that the Secretary of Agriculture issue 
licenses to animal dealers only if the dealers complied with LA WA 
provisions. 22 LA WA also made it unlawful for research facilities to 
purchase dogs or cats from unlicensed dealers. 23 In addition, LA WA 
authorized the Secretary to promulgate standards governing the 
humane handling, care, treatment, and transportation of animals by 
dealers and research facilities. 24 
Congress limited the Secretary's authority, however, by prevent-
ing the Secretary from interfering with the actual research and 
experimentation25 conducted within research facilities. 26 Conse-
17 See infra notes 58-86 and accompanying text. "Protocol" is defined as "an investigator's 
plan for the use of animals in a study of a biomedical problem." 52 Fed. Reg. 10,297 (1987). 
l' See infra note 61 and accompanying text. 
19 See S. REP. No. 1281, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CONGo & 
ADMIN. NEWS 2635, 2636. 
20 Act of August 24, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-544 § 1, 80 Stat. 350 (1966). The Act of August 
24, 1966, is commonly referred to as the "Laboratory Animal Welfare Act" and will be cited 
as such throughout this Comment. 
"' [d. § 1, 80 Stat. 350. 
2'" [d. § 3, 80 Stat. 35l. 
z, [d. § 7, 80 Stat. 35l. 
24 [d. § 13, 80 Stat. 352. 
25 [d. §§ 13, 18,80 Stat. 352; see also S. REP. No. 1281, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 
1966 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 2635,2637 ("[ilt is not the intention of the committee 
to interfere in any way with research or experimentation"). 
26 The statute defines "research facility" as "any school (except an elementary or secondary 
school), institution, or organization, or person that uses or intends to use live animals in 
research, tests, or experiments, and that (1) purchases or transports live animals in commerce, 
or (2) receives [federal] funds ... for the purpose of carrying out research, tests, or experi-
ments .... " 7 U.S.C. § 2132(e)(1982). 
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quently, although LAWA took steps to insure that animals received 
humane care and treatment prior to experimentation, it was not 
designed to alleviate the most basic abuses animals experience dur-
ing experimentation: needless suffering, unnecessarily repetitive ex-
periments, and careless or insensitive treatment by researchers. 27 
The Animal Welfare Act of 1970 (1970 AWA)28 extended to more 
species the protection afforded animals under LAW A, while expand-
ing simultaneously the classes of people subject to LAW A's statutory 
provisions. 29 The 1970 AWA also recognized the need to supply 
animals covered by the statute with basic necessities by requiring 
the Secretary of Agriculture to promulgate standards for the pro-
vision of "basic creature comforts."3o In addition, the 1970 AWA 
increased the Secretary's enforcement powers by increasing penal-
ties against people convicted of interfering with government inspec-
tors, and expanding the discovery procedures for obtaining infor-
mation. 31 Despite these greater protections, Congress reemphasized 
the need to keep the actual research and experimentation process 
free from government interference. 32 
27 See Note, Use of Animals, supra note 6, at 1740-4l. 
28 Animal Welfare Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-579, 84 Stat. 1560 (codified as amended at 7 
U.S.C. §§ 2131-2157 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)). 
29 See H.R. REP. No. 1651, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1970 U.S.CODE CONGo & 
ADMIN. NEWS 5103, 5104 (the 1970 AWA extended protection to all warm-blooded animals 
designated by the Secretary with certain exceptions and brought animal exhibitors and whole-
sale pet dealers into the rubric of regulated classes). 
30 Id. at 5104 (basic creature comforts include proper handling, adequate housing, nutrition, 
sanitation, ventilation, shelter, and veterinary care). 
31 Id. at 5105. 
32 Id. at 5104. "The bill in no manner authorizes the disruption or interference with scientific 
research or experimentation. Under this bill the research scientist still holds the key to the 
laboratory door." Id. 
Congressional reluctance to expand animal protection measures to the experimentation 
process reflects a fear that laboratory regulations will disrupt and stymie biomedical research 
that benefits both humans and animals. Consider the statement of Rep. Montgomery in support 
of the 1970 AWA: "The important point to be made is that we are not tying the hands of 
researchers who are working with animals daily to unlock the secrets of dread diseases." 116 
CONGo REC. 40,156 (1970). If research utilizing laboratory animals is the only means of 
obtaining specific types of medical advancements, then the urgency to maintain such essential 
research is acutely felt. 
Tremendous technological improvements have occurred, however, over the past few de-
cades. Consequently, alternatives to animal experimentation exist today that were not avail-
able twenty years ago. For example, consider the following statement. "Many of the presently 
available alternative techniques are more reliable and more time and cost effective than the 
traditional methods. Animal tests for carcinogens can take three and a half years and a half 
million dollars to complete. Use of comprehensive non-animal alternatives would provide 
identical protection and take only three months at a cost of only $25,000." ISLAA Hearings, 
supra note 8, at 144 (statement of John E. McArdle, Director, Laboratory Animal Welfare, 
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In enacting the Animal Welfare Act Amendments of 1976 (1976 
Amendments),33 Congress targeted animal treatment during trans-
portation and the use of animals in animal fights. 34 The 1976 Amend-
ments extended A W A to cover intermediate handlers and carriers 
who were not covered under prior A WA provisions. 35 The 1976 
Amendments also established a criminal penalty for persons involved 
with animal fighting.36 In addition, the 1976 Amendments established 
uniform civil penalties for any AWA violation. 37 
Even though the 1976 Amendments declared for the first time a 
congressional intention to provide humane care and treatment for 
research animals,38 Congress did not express a willingness to open 
up the research and experimentation process to government regu-
lation. In fact, Congress reiterated that decisions regarding animal 
experimentation were exclusively the province of research facili-
ties. 39 
After the 1976 Amendments, AWA was not amended again until 
ISLAA was enacted in 1985. The early A WA legislation was bene-
ficial because it established federal regulations governing the pre-
experimentation care of research animals. Prior to 1985, AW A's most 
glaring substantive deficiency was its failure to shield animals from 
abuse suffered in the experimentation process. 40 Research protocols 
were insulated from external review. Any regulation of animal treat-
ment within the laboratory was the sole prerogative of the research 
facility. 41 
the Humane Society of the United States). Thus, requiring researchers to consider alternatives 
to animal experimentation has multiple benefits. First, it prevents the unnecessary infliction 
of pain on research animals. Second, it hastens biomedical progress by forcing researchers to 
consider alternative methods that may be more efficient, accurate, and cost effective than 
animal experimentation. 
33 Animal Welfare Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-279, 90 Stat. 417 (codified as 
amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 2131-2157 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)). 
34 See H.R. REP. No. 801, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONGo & 
ADMIN. NEWS 758, 759. 
35 7 U.S.C. § 2132(i),(j) (1976). 
36Id. § 2156(e). 
37Id. § 2149(b). 
38 Id. § 2131. "[R]egulation of animals and activities as provided in this Act is necessary 
... to insure that animals intended for use in research facilities or for exhibition purposes or 
for use as pets are provided humane care and treatment." Id. 
39Id. § 2143(a). "Nothing in this chapter shall be construed as authorizing the Secretary to 
promulgate rules, regulations, or orders with regard to design, outlines, guidelines, or per-
formance of actual research or experimentation by a research facility as determined by such 
research facility." I d. 
40 See Dresser, supra note 6, at 1162. 
41 The Secretary of Agriculture was only authorized to promulgate standards requiring the 
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From an animal welfare perspective, congressional reluctance to-
ward granting USDA the power to regulate research protocols was 
not the only deficiency limiting the legislation's effectiveness. En-
forcement of A W A has been suspect since its inception. 42 The Animal 
and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) is the USDA agency 
that administers AWA. From 1968 through 1980, there were only 
three criminal prosecutions against A W A violators and only 122 
completed administrative prosecutions. 43 An earlier study of prose-
cutions conducted during the first decade of AWA's existence re-
vealed that even when violators were prosecuted, there were sub-
stantial time lags between discovery of the violations and their 
resolution. 44 
A 1985 General Accounting Office (GAO) report analyzed USDA's 
Animal Welfare Program. 45 The report revealed some of the major 
difficulties APHIS encountered when implementing AWA. These 
difficulties included the following: 1) APHIS inspectors spent a min-
imal amount of time conducting A W A inspections because of the 
numerous programs APHIS administers;46 2) APHIS personnel in-
dicated that four inspections per site per year was the optimal in-
spection level,47 however, research facilities in the six states studied 
appropriate use of anesthetic, analgesic, or tranquilizing drugs, when the use of such drugs 
is proper in the opinion of the attending veterinarian at research facilities. 7 U.S.C. § 2143(a) 
(1976). 
42 See i1\fra note 44 and accompanying text. 
43 Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, United States Dep't. of Agriculture, Pros-
ecutions for Animal Welfare Violations 1968-1980 passim (December 1980). Twenty-eight 
administrative prosecutions were started by October 1, 1980 but had not been completed at 
the time of the study. Id. at 19. 
14 See Rickleen, supra note 6, at 137-40 for a more detailed description of enforcement 
inadequacies from 1966-1976. It should be noted, however, that in the two years prior to 
ISLAA, the number of completed prosecutions increased dramatically over previous years. 
In 1980 and 1981 there were 20 and 23 cases closed by prosecution, respectively. In contrast, 
there were 50 and 45 cases closed by prosecution in 1983 and 1984. Cj. Animal Plant and 
Health Inspection Service, United States Dep't. of Agriculture, Animal Welfare Enforcement 
Report, Fiscal Years 1980, 1981, 1983, and 1984. 
45 The Dep't. of Agriculture's Animal Welfare Program, Document No. RCED-85-8 (May 
16, 1985) [hereinafter GAO Report] (audit by the U.S. General Accounting Office). The report 
studied the APHIS Animal Welfare Program which implements the USDA regulations, 9 
C.F.R. §§ 1.1-12.10 (1987), under AWA. The GAO report focused on six APHIS area offices 
in California, Iowa, Kansas, Missouri, New York, and Texas. GAO Report at ii. 
46 During fiscal year 1983, the year of the study, 13.4% of inspector time was devoted to 
AWA inspections. The amount of time allocated to AWA inspections., however, varied from 
state to state. For example, California inspectors spent 5.7% of their time while Kansas 
inspectors spent 25.9% of their time conducting AWA inspections. Id. at 7; see also infra note 
51 and accompanying text. 
47 GAO Report, supra note 45, at 21. 
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were inspected an average of .82 times in 1983;48 and 3) the training 
of APHIS inspectors was considered inadequate by approximately 
half of the APHIS regional and area office officials interviewed, and 
some inspectors also found their training to be inadequate while 
others expressed reservations about their training. 49 
USDA emphasized to the GAO that the primary reason for inad-
equate training and infrequent inspections was insufficient funding 
of the Animal Welfare Program. 50 APHIS administers nineteen an-
imal health programs including the Animal Welfare Program which 
was alloted only 2.8 percent of USDA's 1983 funds. 51 USDA re-
quested program funding cuts in 1983, 1984, and 1985, and proposed 
that the program be eliminated in 1986. 52 USDA supported these 
cuts claiming that: 1) the states, industry, humane societies, and 
individuals should be the principal enforcers of the animal welfare 
regulations; and 2) USDA fiscal constraints necessitated resource 
concentration on areas that protect agriculture from pests and dis-
eases. 53 GAO concluded that if Congress decided to continue to fund 
A W A enforcement, it should consider allowing USDA to recover 
more of the cost from the regulated parties. 54 
The difficulties APHIS experienced in administering the Animal 
Welfare Program were not surprising. The Office of the Secretary 
of Agriculture expressed its reluctance concerning USDA's enforce-
ment responsibilities during the original enactment of LAW A, and 
during the subsequent amendments in both 1970 and 1976.55 The 
4' Id. at 20. The average of .82 inspections per research facility in 1983 is misleading. 
Statistics for the two states with substantially more research facilities than the other four, 
New York and California, revealed that 50% of New York research facilities and 52.4% of 
California research facilities were not inspected in 1983. Id. at 45-46. 
'9Id. at 16-17. In fiscal year 1983, an average of .56 staff days were allocated to formal 
inspector training at the six area offices. I d. at 8. 
50Id. at 33. 
51Id. 
52Id. at 3. 
53 Id. In its fiscal year 1981 plans, however, APHIS projected a request for increased funding 
for 1982-87 hoping to increase inspection frequency to six times per year at all licensees and 
registrants except for carriers and dealers where 36 inspections per year was the goal. APHIS 
stated that this was the desired inspection level for an effective enforcement program. Id. at 
21. USDA's apparently contradictory stances regarding the Animal Welfare Program's funding 
were basically the result of "Reaganomics." According to one APHIS veterinarian, USDA's 
request for funding cuts in 1983 was a manifestation of the Reagan Administration's general 
policy to shift the burden of administering various programs from the federal government to 
the states. Telephone interview with Dr. William Smith, Veterinarian in Charge of the APHIS 
New England Area Office, Waltham, MA (March 7, 1988). 
54 GAO Report, supra note 45, at 33. 
55 See Letter from Secretary of the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), as 
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GAO report indicates that USDA's enforcement difficulties were an 
inevitable consequence of an overburdened governmental agency, 
tackling responsibilities it was ill-equipped to handle. The APHIS 
enforcement effort prior to ISLAA was understaffed, underfunded, 
and without adequate knowledge to carry out productive inspec-
tions. 56 Others, however, believe that USDA's unwillingness to en-
force AWA was a prominent factor in the agency's shortcomingsY 
Against this background of limited regulatory authority and min-
imal enforcement, ISLAA arose. 58 ISLAA expanded USDA's regu-
latory authority and provided a new enforcement scheme to aid 
APHIS in administering the Act. 
III. THE IMPROVED STANDARDS FOR LABORATORY ANIMALS ACT 
On December 23, 1985, Congress took a major step toward recti-
fying AW A's inadequacies by enacting ISLAA. ISLAA's passage 
marked the fruition of a two-year legislative effort to provide labo-
ratory animals increased protection from abusive research. 59 ISLAA 
attempts to balance the needs of the biomedical research community 
and the public concern for the humane treatment of laboratory ani-
mals. 60 ISLAA, for the first time in AWA's twenty-two year history, 
seeks to limit the amount of pain and distress animals suffer during· 
the actual experimentation process. 61 
contained in S. REP. No. 1281, supra note 19, at 2642-43 ("Accordingly, there is a question 
as to whether it would be desirable that a law such as that in question be administered by a 
Federal agency more directly concerned and having greater expertise with respect to the 
subject than this Department."); Letter from the Office of the Secretary of USDA, as con-
tained in H.R. REP. No. 1651, supra note 29, at 5105-06 ("This Department agrees with the 
objective of the bill .... However, we believe that the Department of Health, Education, and 
Welfare is the appropriate agency to administer such an activity."); Letter from the. Office of 
the Secretary of USDA, as contained in H.R. REP. No. 801, supra note 34, at 766-67. ("There 
are available alternative measures which can achieve many of the objectives of the bill. These 
alternatives should be fully explored and tested before any additional legislative action is 
taken."). 
,,6 Dresser, supra note 6, at 1162-63. 
57 Dukes, supra note 6, at 525-27; Rickleen, supra note 6, at 141 (USDA's poor enforcement 
record manifests the ageny's attitudes and priorities regarding AWA). 
"" Food Security Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-198, §§ 1751-59, 99 Stat. 1645 (1985) (codified 
in relevant part at 7 U.S.C. §§ 2131-2157 (Supp. IV 1986)). 
59 Senator Dole and Congressman Brown initially introduced two bills in their respective 
houses. S. 657, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONGo REC. 2013 (1983) and H.R. 5725, 98th Congo 
2d Sess., 130 CONGo REC. 2453 (1984). These bills eventually resulted in ISLAA to AWA 
which became law in the Food Security Act of 1985. See Reagan, Federal Regulation of 
Testing with Laboratory Animals: Future Decisions, 3 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 165, 169-70 
n.25 (1986) for a more detailed analysis of ISLAA legislative history. 
60 7 U.S.C. § 2131 (Supp. IV 1986). 
61 I d. § 2143(a)(3)(A). 
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To ensure minimal animal pain during experimentation proce-
dures,62 Congress directed the Secretary to promulgate require-
ments for: 1) the use of anesthetics, analgesics, tranquilizing drugs, 
and euthanasia when appropriate;63 2) the consideration by the prin-
cipal investigator of alternative research practices if an animal will 
suffer pain or distress;64 3) the consultation with a veterinarian in 
planning research protocols that could cause pain to animals;65 and 
4) the use of animals in only one major operation, from which they 
are allowed to recover, unless it is a scientific necessity, or the 
Secretary deems that special circumstances require that further 
research be conducted. 66 
ISLAA directs the Secretary to require each facility to submit 
reports, at least annually, to verify facility compliance with the 
ISLAA provisions set forth above. 67 These reports must contain: 1) 
information of pain-producing procedures and assurances that the 
principle investigator considered alternatives;68 2) assurances of com-
pliance with the provisions of ISLAA section 2143;69 and 3) expla-
nations for deviations from the prescribed standards. 70 
ISLAA also created an internal review mechanism known as an 
Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee (IACUC or Commit-
tee) which is responsible for representing society's concerns for the 
welfare of laboratory animals. 71 Each facility covered by A WA must 
have at least one IACUC.72 The Committee must consist of at least 
three members appointed by the chief executive officer of each re-
search facility.73 Of these Committee members, at least one must be 
a veterinarian,74 and at least one cannot be connected with the 
research facility and should provide representation of the general 
community's interest in animal welfare. 75 
IACUCs must conduct at least semi-annual inspections of research 
facilities76 and submit a certification report fo! each inspection 
62 [d. § 2143(a)(3). 
6;l [d. § 2143(a)(3)(A). 
64 [d. § 2143(a)(3)(B). 
65 [d. § 2143(a)(3)(C). 
66 [d. § 2143(a)(3)(D). 
67 [d. § 2143(a)(7)(A). 
Gil [d. § 2143(a)(7)(B)(i). 
69 [d. § 2143(a)(7)(B)(ii). 
7IJ [d. § 2143(a)(7)(B)(iii). 
71 [d. § 2143(b)(1) ("committee" is defined in § 2143(n)). 
n [d. 
7:l [d. 
74 [d. § 2143(b)(1)(A). 
75 [d. § 2143(b)(1)(B). 
76Id. § 2143(b)(3). 
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made. 77 The reports must include: 1) the signatures of a majority of 
the IACUC members;78 2) any violations of standards and deviations 
from approved protocols that adversely affected animal welfare;79 
and 3) minority views of the Committee members.80 If any violations 
of ISLAA's provisions are found during an inspection, the IACUC 
will notify the facility to allow for corrective action. 81 If the research 
facility fails to take corrective action, the Committee will notify 
APHIS and the federal agency funding the research. 82 For federal 
research facilities, a federal committee will be appointed to carry 
out the same functions as the IACUCs. The federal committee must 
report any deficiencies to the head of the agency conducting the 
research who is then responsible for corrective measures. 83 
To augment the animal protection measures, ISLAA provides 
training for facility personnel on how to provide better animal care. 84 
ISLAA also established an information service at the National Ag-
ricultural Library to aid in such employee training.85 Furthermore, 
ISLAA increases the civil penalties for AWA violations by research 
facilities. 86 
In accordance with ISLAA mandates, the Secretary of Agriculture 
proposed revised regulations, the Proposed Rules, to incorporate 
77Id. § 2143(b)(4)(A). 
7" Id. § 2143(b)(4)(A)(i). 
79Id. § 2143(b)(4)(A)(ii). 
8°Id. § 2143(b)(4)(A)(iii). Requiring IACUCs to set forth minority views in inspection re-
ports is an extremely important provision. It provides a check against unlimited Committee 
discretion regarding the content of inspection reports. APHIS personnel, pursuant to ISLAA 
section 2143(b)(5), are afforded the opportunity to review the inspection reports. Minority 
views preserved in the reports enable APHIS personnel to review Committee assessments 
from a variety of perspectives. If legitimate concerns expressed by a minority of Committee 
members are ignored by the majority, the inspection reports will notify APHIS of such 
concerns. 
If Committee non-compliance with AWA and the Proposed Rules is established, the question 
remains about how to address the problem. Neither AWA nor the Proposed Rules define a 
remedial procedure to correct Committee irresponsiveness. Congress should close this loophole 
by authorizing the Secretary to replace, or compel research facilities to replace, Committee 
members who persistently approve facility actions that, in USDA's view, violate A WA. The 
necessity for such a removal mechanism becomes even more apparent when one considers the 
potential problems with IACUC composition discussed infra notes 208-11 and the accom-
panying text. 
81 Id. § 2143(b)(4)(C). 
82Id. 
B3 Id. § 2143(c). 
84 Id. § 2143(d). 
H5 Id. § 2143(e). 
"6 Id. § 2149(b). Civifpenalties were increased to a maximum of $2,500 for an AWA violation 
and $1,500 for failure to obey a cease and desist order. Each day an AWA violation or failure 
to obey a cease and desist order continues is considered a separate violation. Id. 
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the ISLAA requirements. 87 APHIS clearly states in the Proposed 
Rules that both ISLAA and weak past and present enforcement 
efforts demand stronger requirements and more specific .responsi-
bilities for each IACUC to ensure that animals receive humane care 
and treatment in research facilities. 88 The Proposed Rules thus re-
quire Committee review of all pain-inflicting protocols and the con-
dition of the animals exposed to such treatment. 89 ISLAA has two 
exceptions to research areas subject to Committee inspection: where 
animals are studied in their natural environments and where the 
study areas are not readily accessible. 90 The Proposed Rules, how-
ever, would require that requests for exceptions be made specifying 
why the inspection should not be conducted. 91 
An important addition to the current regulations would require 
Committee approval of pain-inflicting research protocols used on 
warm-blooded animals prior to the actual experimentation. 92 .In ad-
dition, the Committee cannot approve pain-inflicting research pro-
tocols where the pain is not dissipated, unless the Committee, after 
evaluating the researcher's justification, deems that such procedures 
are scientifically necessary.93 Before any protocol approval, the IA-
CUC must require assurance from the principal inves~igator that: 1) 
alternatives were considered; 2) the experiment is necessary; :) pain-
relieving drugs will be administered properly according to the at-
tending veterinarian; 4) appropriate post- and pre-surgical care will 
be administered; and 5) asceptic surgery will be properly con-
ducted. 94 
The Secretary also proposed a new section95 to the Animal Welfare 
Regulations to provide for better veterinary care at research facili-
ties. 96 The inability of attending veterinarians to inspect research 
areas properly under the current regulations prompted this addi-
tion. 97 The new section would require the IACUC's attending veter-
87 52 Fed. Reg. 10,292 (1987) (to be codified at 9 C.F.R. Pts. 1 & 2) (proposed March 31, 
1987). 
R!l Id. at 1O,30l. 
88Id. 
90 7 U.S.C. § 2143(b)(3)(B) (Supp. IV 1986). 
81 52 Fed. Reg. 10,301 (1987), supra note 87. 
92Id. at 10,302. 
93Id. 
94Id. 
95Id. at 10,303. The new section (§ 2.40) is entitled "Attending Veterinarian and Adequate 
Veterinary Care" and replaces dupli<!ative sections in 9 C.F.R. Part 3. 
96 52 Fed. Reg. 10,303, supra note 87. 
97Id. (APHIS was informed by attending veterinarians that they were denied access to 
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inarian to provide consultation and guidance in planning protocols 
and in conducting experiments to ensure that animal welfare is 
safeguarded. 98 
Finally, it is important to realize that AWA, since its enactment 
in 1966, had stated that "[n]othing in this chapter shall be construed 
as authorizing the Secretary to promulgate rules, regulations or 
orders with regard to design, outlines, guidelines, or performance 
of actual research or experimentation by a research facility as de-
termined by such research facility. "99 That statement was modified 
in ISLAA which now directs the Secretary to regulate the experi-
mentation process lOO within certain limits specified in the statute. 101 
Consequently, the Proposed Rules contain a new proviso stating: 
"exceptions . . . to the standards [promulgated pursuant to the IS-
LAA mandates in section 2143] may be made for research facilities 
only when such exceptions are specified in the research protocol; are 
explained in detail; and are approved by the Committee."102 USDA 
believes that this new proviso reflects congressional determinations 
regarding the desired level of research regulation. 10:3 
ISLAA and the Proposed Rules indicate that both Congress and 
USDA realized AWA needed a substantial revision if animal experi-
mentation under A WA is to be conducted humanely. Prior to ISLAA, 
researchers were free to disregard the pain they inflicted on labo-
ratory animals during experimentation. Under ISLAA and the Pro-
posed Rules, such insensitivity will not go unchecked. Response to 
the Proposed Rules, however, has not been entirely supportive. The 
research community has voiced concern that the Proposed Rules, if 
implemented, would significantly impede valuable biomedical re-
search. 
IV. RESPONSE TO THE PROPOSED RULES 
A. The Research Community's Response 
The National Association for Biomedical Research (NABR) sub-
mitted comments to USDA regarding the Proposed Rules on June 
research sites and were pressured to accept the veterinary care being provided even if it was 
inadequate). 
98Id. at 10,304. 
997 U.S.C. § 2143(a) (1982). 
100 7 U.S.C. § 2143(a)(3) (Supp. IV 1986). See supra notes 63-66 and accompanying text for 
a more detailed discussion of the Secretary's regulatory authority. 
101 7 U.S.C. § 2143(a)(6) (Supp. IV 1986). 
102 I d. at 10,305. 
103 Id. 
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30, 1987. 104 The NABR Comments reveal the research community's 
immediate concern and disappointment with the Proposed Rules. 
NABR disagrees with the Proposed Rules on several major points. 
First, NABR believes that the Proposed Rules are not an accurate 
reflection of congressional intent, and go beyond the statutory au-
thority of ISLAA.105 Specifically, NABR is concerned with: 1) the 
review and approval of research protocols; 2) the categories of re-
search use animals; 3) USDA's delegation of enforcement responsi-
bility to the IACUCs and the attending veterinarians; and 4) the 
procedures whereby facility employees report alleged deficiencies to 
APHIS.106 NABR alleges that the Secretary, in proposing the new 
regulations, exceeded his authority and created new law instead of 
carrying out the congressional intent embodied in ISLAA.107 
Second, NABR contends that USDA failed to demonstrate how 
the agency record supports the Proposed Rules. lOs According to 
NABR, USDA assertions substantiating many of its "expansive in-
trusions" are unsupported by fact, lack citation to the appropriate 
statutory sections justifying their creation, and lack adequate ref-
erences to ISLAA's legislative history.109 In addition, N ABR claims 
that many of the proposals, founded on a factual basis, fail to reveal 
how they would remedy the problems at hand. 110 
Third, NABR argues that the Proposed Rules do not permit the 
"flexibility and innovation" essential to ensure laboratory animal 
welfare and instead impermissibly interfere with research. 111 N ABR 
asserts that, in promulgating the Proposed Rules, the Secretary 
failed to limit interference with research and experimentation to the 
extent required by ISLAA.112 Supporting this contention, N ABR 
104 See NABR Comments, supra note 13. NABR defines itself as "a non-profit organization 
of more than 300 institutions-universities, medical and veterinary schools, teaching hospitals, 
academic and professional societies, voluntary health organizations, pharmaceutical, labora-
tory, animal breeder and other related research-related companies-all intimately involved 
in essential biomedical research, safety testing and education which, of necessity, require the 
use of laboratory animals." [d. at l. 
105 [d. at 18-22. 
106 [d. at 20-2l. 
107 [d. at 22. 
108 [d. In support of its assertion, NABR cites Bowen u. American Hasp. Ass'n, 476 U.S. 
610, 621 (1986) which states that there must be a "rational connection" between the facts 
justifying agency action and the action taken. 
109 [d. at 23. 
110 [d. at 23-24. APHIS addressed this allegation in part, however, when it sent evidentiary 
documentation supporting the Proposed Rules to NABR on June 18, 1987, pursuant to N ABR's 
Freedom of Information Act request. [d. at 24. 
III [d. 
112 [d. at 27-28. 
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states that prior versions of the legislation, granting the Secretary 
much broader regulatory power, were amended to contain the com-
promise language of section 2143(a)(6) of ISLAA.113 Section 
2143(a)(6) precludes the Secretary from regulating research beyond 
specific areas designated in ISLAA.114 Consequently, N ABR claims 
that the Proposed Rules' sweeping regulations are inconsistent with 
ISLAA's legislative history and concise language. 1l5 
Fourth, NABR insists that the Proposed Rules are inconsistent 
with the Public Health Service (PHS) requirements. 116 According to 
NABR, these inconsistencies include: 1) what constitutes review 
and approval of research protocols; 2) the scope and basis of IACUC 
inspections; 3) the IACUC's and attending veterinarian's responsi-
bilities to the research facility; and 4) the definition of "painful pro-
cedure. "117 In accordance with congressional intent,118 N ABR re-
quests that the Secretary of Agriculture coordinate with the 
Secretary of Health and Human Services to ensure that the codified 
rules maintain consistency with PHS regulations. 119 Such consistency 
is appropriate because over half of the research facilities subject to 
AW A's provisions must also comply with PHS policy.120 
Fifth, cited "as perhaps the most disturbing aspect" of the Pro-
posed Rules, is the extent of the enforcement authority given to the 
113 Id. at 26-27. 
114 7 U.S.C. § 2143(a)(6) (Supp. IV 1986). 
115 NABR Comments, supra note 13, at 24-28 (specific NABR objections are set forth in 
§ III(c) of the NABR Comments). 
116 See id. at 28. The Public Health Service (PHS) also funds research which utilizes labo-
ratory animals. PHS has its own requirements regarding the humane treatment of laboratory 
animals which must be met by those facilities receiving PHS funding. See generally The 
National Institutes of Health, Department of Health and Human Services, Guide for the Care 
and Use of Laboratory Animals, Publication No. 85-23 (1985); Public Health Service Policy 
on Humane Care and Use of Laboratory Animals (Sept. 1986) (setting forth PHS policy and 
requirements). 
!l7 NABR Comments, supra note 13, at 29. The National Institutes of Health (NIH) utilizes 
IACUCs to police NIH guidelines. The Health Research Extension Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 
99-158, 99 Stat. 820 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 201 (1982 & Supp. III 1985», expanded the role 
of IACUCs in implementing PHS policy. See 42 U.S.C. § 289d(b) (Supp. III 1985), for the 
IACUC statutory requirements. 
IACUC composition and responsibility under the Health Research Extension Act and 
ISLAA are basically consistent. Compare NIH requirements in the Public Health Service 
Policy on Humane Care and Use of Laboratory Animals at 5-9 (Sept. 1986), with USDA 
IACUC requirements, 52 Fed. Reg. 10,312-15 (1987) (proposed March 31, 1987). 
118 H.R. CONF. REP. No. 447, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 598 (1985), reprinted in 1985 U.S. 
CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 2524 ("it is hoped that the agencies continue an open commu-
nication to avoid conflicting regulations wherever possible"). 
119 See NABR Comments, supra note 13, at 30. 
l2°Id. 
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IACUCs and the attending veterinarians.l21 NABR questions the 
validity of allocating to private individuals the direct responsibility 
of carrying out USDA enforcement efforts under AWA.122 NABR 
contends that the proper role of IACUCs is not to function as agents 
of the federal government but as agents of the research facilities 
which, in most instances, possess an employer/employee relationship 
with the Committee members. 123 
Beyond these primary points of contention with the enforcement 
provisions of the Proposed Rules, NABR claims that the record-
keeping requirements are too costly and unnecessarily burdensome 
on the research community. 124 Furthermore, NABR asserts that the 
overall cost of compliance with the regulations would: 1) delay re-
search progress; 2) erode the competitive position of American re-
search in the world market; 3) shift the scientific and trade strength 
from the United States to foreign countries; and 4) result in the 
divergence of funds previously allocated to research endeavors to 
the absorption of costs associated with administering the Proposed 
Rules. 125 
NABR, in short, believes that the Proposed Rules, if imple-
mented, would have a detrimental impact on biomedical research. 
NABR claims that USDA surpassed congressional intent by estab-
121 Id. at 30-33. NABR contended that under the Proposed Rules, Committee involvement 
interjects APHIS into the research facility's decision-making process, id. at 31, and attending 
veterinarians serve as deputized 24-hour inspectors. Id. at 33. 
Conversely, some researchers say that, at least in a university setting, internal review 
committees are necessary to assure the humane treatment of laboratory animals. Dr. Herbert 
Rackow pointed out that a study entitled "Whistle blowing in Biomedical Research" (1981), 
revealed the need for internal review. 
"It points out that scientists in a university setting are under pressure to produce 
results and justify more money for more research. Promotion, tenure, salary, labo-
ratory space and help, travel, and other professional prerequisites depend upon 
research productivity. There is a strong conflict of interest that may affect even the 
best persons. The university system of governance grants almost complete autonomy 
to departments and individual scientists . . . . If these considerations concerning 
research on human subjects are valid, then the need for protection is even greater 
when the subjects are animals." 
ISLAA Hearings, supra note 8, at 98-99 (statement of Herbert Rackow, M.D., Diplomate, 
American Board of Anesthesiology; Professor Emeritus, College of Physicians and Surgeons, 
Columbia University; Representing Scientists Group for Reform of Animal Experimentation). 
122 Id. at 3l. 
12:1 Id. at 35. 
124 See NABR ICP Comments, supra note 13, passim. 
125 See NABR study entitled Economic Impact of Animal Welfare Regulation on Biomedical 
Innovation, Research and Development, 9 (June, 1987). The Association estimates that the 
cost to the research community of implementing the Proposed Rules would reach $144 million. 
Id. 
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lishing regulatory measures not explicitly warranted by ISLAA.126 
NABR's primary concern, however, involves the IACUC's and the 
attending veterinarian's enforcement authority pursuant to the Pro-
posed Rules. 127 NABR perceives such authority as an unreasonable 
usurpation of researcher autonomy. 128 
B. The Animal Welfare Community's Response 
In stark contrast to NABR's position, organizations advocating 
increased protection for laboratory animals applauded the USDA's 
Proposed Rules which, in their view, take a large step toward pro-
viding an effective safeguard for laboratory animal welfare. 129 
Though the Comments submitted by the Animal Legal Defense Fund 
(ALDF) support the USDA's strong stance in the Proposed Rules, 
ALDF believes that ISLAA grants the agency even greater freedom 
to require stricter compliance standards. 130 
For example, ALDF recommended additions to the Proposed 
Rules in several areas. ALDF suggested that the Proposed Rules 
include rats, mice, and birds in the definition of "animal," thereby 
affording them A W A protection. 131 ALD F believed that the annual 
reports which research facilities submit to USDA should be more 
exacting to ensure facility compliance. 132 ALDF also advocated the 
126 See supra notes 112-15 and accompanying text. 
127 See supra notes 121-22 and accompanying text. 
12" NABR Comments, supra note 13, at 31. Requiring IACUC approval of pain-inflicting 
protocols "effectively interjects APHIS into the decision-making process of the facility itself, 
since APHIS can dictate the procedures which require enhanced scrutiny." Id. 
129 See Animal Legal Defense Fund Comments on the U.S. Department of Agriculture's 
Proposed Rules to Implement the 1985 Amendments to the Animal Welfare Act, at 27 (June 
26, 1987) [hereinafter ALDF Comments] ("ALDF commends the USDA for its foresight in 
promulgating rules which aggressively seek to further the intent of Congress in its passage 
of the [ISLAA],,); see also Letter from Christine Stevens of the Society for Animal Protective 
Legislation to USDA (May 22, 1987) ("The serious and thorough work accomplished in the 
writing of the proposed regulations, ... deserves high commendation. "); Letter from Dennis 
J. White of the American Humane Society to USDA (June 15, 1987) (the Proposed Rules 
reflect deep thought and hard work ... those who drafted the proposal should be compli-
mented). 
130 Letter from Joyce Tischler, Executive Director of ALDF, to Dr. Crawford of APHIS 
(June 26, 1987) (contained in ALDF Comments, supra note 129). 
l:ll Id. at 2. "The term 'animal' means any live or dead dog, cat, monkey (non-human primate 
mammal), guinea pig, hamster, rabbit, or such other warm-blooded animal, as the Secretary 
may determine is being used, or is intended for use, for research, testing, experimentation 
... " 7 U.S.C. § 2132(g) (1982). 
1:12 ALDF Comments, supra note 129, at 8-10. ALDF asserted that the current form used 
for annual reports allows researchers to summarize their actions without providing explana-
tions. ALDF studied a number of research projects in fiscal year 1984 and discovered that a 
number of experiments that would be considered "painful" under section 2.35 of the Proposed 
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following changes in IACUC composition and duties: 1) all research 
protocols should be subject to Committee review;133 2) the number 
of non-affiliated members should remain proportionate to the total 
size of the IACUC;134 3) no person who has engaged in research 
using animal subjects should serve as a non-affiliated Committee 
member;135 4) a non-affiliated member should be appointed through 
a formal mechanism;I36 and 5) the IACUC should have the power to 
suspend activity not in accordance with the Act. 137 
In addition, the Society for Animal Protective Legislation and the 
Michigan Humane Society submitted replies to USDA regarding 
NABR's Comments. 138 The apparent purpose of the replies was to 
reinforce the organizations' support for the Proposed Rules and to 
thwart NABR's efforts to persuade USDA to promulgate less intru-
sive regulations. 
V. PRIVATE CAUSES OF ACTION: AN INVIABLE ALTERNATIVE To 
ADMINISTRATIVE ENFORCEMENT 
The necessity for thorough regulations giving USDA the ability 
to police AW A's provisions effectively should not be underestimated. 
Rules, were not reported as such in the annual reports of those facilities conducting the 
research. Id. at 9 (citing ALDF Submission on Pain and Anesthesia With Reference To The 
Improved Standards For Laboratory Animals Act of 1985, at 11-29 (1986) [hereinafter Sub-
mission on Pain]). Therefore, ALDF claimed that without a more detailed annual report, 
USDA will be unable to rectify the apparent discrepancies between USDA and research 
facilities regarding what constitutes a painful procedure. ALDF Comments, supra note 129, 
at 9. 
ALDF also argued that researchers' explanations in the annual reports for witholding pain 
relieving drugs, in the few instances where such witholding was acknowledged, were "conclu-
sory and inadequate." Id. (citing Submission on Pain, at 30-41). 
In order to alleviate these problems, ALDF suggested that the annual reports of research 
facilities contain adequate information to allow USDA to make its own determinations re-
garding: 1) whether a procedure is "painful" under section 2.35 of the Proposed Rules; 2) 
whether pain-relieving drugs were properly administered during painful procedures; 3) 
whether the witholding of pain-relieving drugs was justified; and 4) whether the principal 
investigator actually considered alternatives to painful procedures. Id. at 8-9. 
133Id. at 11. 
134Id. at 15. 
135Id. at 16. 
136Id. ALDF proposes that the non-affiliated member be selected by a "formal review of 
the applications of qualified individuals, consultation with recognized leaders of the animal 
welfare community ... and a noticed hearing which is open to the public." Id. (citing 
§ 2.35(a)(5)(ii) of the Proposed Rules). 
137Id. at 17. 
138 Letter from Christine Stevens, Secretary of the Society for Animal Protective Legislation 
to Dr. Crawford of USDA (August 27, 1987); Letter from Eileen Liska of the Michigan Humane 
Society to James C. Miller at the Office of Management and Budget (August 24, 1987) 
(concerning NABR Comments on the Proposed Rules). 
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The animal welfare community's enthusiasm for the Proposed Rules, 
expressed in their Comments, is readily understandable given that 
no viable alternatives currently exist for enforcing AWA outside of 
the regulatory framework established in ISLAA.139 The obstacles 
blocking private parties from obtaining judicial review of alleged 
AWA violations are substantial. A Fourth Circuit case, Interna-
tional Primate Protection League v. Institute for Behavioral 
Research140 (lPPL), illustrates two major difficulties associated with 
private party lawsuits to enforce AWA: 1) establishing standing to 
sue; and 2) establishing that an implied cause of action exists to 
enforce the Act.141 
IPPL is the only142 federal case to date that addresses these issues 
with respect to A W A. 143 The case involved the plaintiff 
organizations'144 attempt to enjoin the defendant institute (IBR) from 
regaining possession of primates that were confiscated after the head 
of the institute was convicted in Maryland state court of criminally 
violating the state's anti-cruelty statutes. 145 The court based its con-
139 See infra note 185 and accompanying text. 
140 799 F.2d 934 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S.Ct. 1624, reh'g denied, 107 S.Ct. 2492 
(1987). 
141 See generally Comment, Private Rights of Action Under Amtrack and Ash: Some 
Implications for Implication, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1392 (1975). The standing and implied 
private cause of action determinations are related but not the same. Standing focuses on 
whether the party bringing the suit is the proper one. In contrast, determining whether an 
implied cause of action exists depends on whether the action is authorized by the statute 
allegedly violated. Id. at 1409. 
142 Civil Action No. 81-2691, Humane Society of the United States v. Block, and Civil Action 
No. 81-2977, Fund for Animals v. Malone, were two other actions commenced because of the 
IBR incident. However, the District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed these cases. 
The plaintiffs in Humane Society sought to compel the Secretary of Agriculture to enforce 
AWA provisions against IBR. The plaintiffs in Fundfor Animals sought a general declaration 
of the responsibilities of USDA and NIH to control the treatment of research animals and 
also requested an injunction preventing the return of the primates to IBR. The district court 
dismissed these actions because, in the court's view, the enforcement authority of NIH and 
USDA officials under NIH regulations and AWA is "wholly discretionary." IPPL, 799 F.2d 
at 937. 
143 The reason for the lack of litigation stemming from attempted private enforcement of 
AWA provisions appears to be twofold. First, AWA standards are designed to be enforced 
administratively. Second, the "injury in fact" necessary for standing is difficult to establish 
without actual contact with abused laboratory animals. Research facility confines effectively 
insulate laboratory animals from contact with potential plaintiffs. 
144 In addition to IPPL, two corporations, the Animal Law Enforcement Association (ALEA) 
and People for Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA), along with several individuals, brought 
the suit. IPPL, 799 F.2d at 936. 
145 In 1981, Dr. Taub, the chief of the Biology Center of IBR, was convicted of violating 
Article 27, § 59 of the Maryland Code. The conviction was eventually reversed on appeal 
because the court found that the Maryland statute did not apply to an institution conducting 
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viction on the inadequate care the facility provided the primates 
being used for research. 146 The civil complaint in the federal case 
alleged that the IBR had violated both Maryland law and A WA. 147 
The civil action was commenced to prevent IBR from regaining 
possession of the primates and to designate the organizations as 
guardians of the monkeys.148 The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, 
however, affirmed the decision of the district court dismissing the 
suit for lack of standing and for failure to establish an implied cause 
of action that could entitle the organizations to injunctive relief.149 
The following two sub-sections explore why the IPPL plaintiffs were 
unable to establish standing and, in addition, why AWA does not 
provide for an implied private cause of action. 
A. Standing to Sue 
Standing involves the determination of whether "a party has a 
sufficient stake in an otherwise justiciable eontroversy to obtain 
resolution of that controversy. "150 The standing doctrine finds its 
origin in article III of the United States Constitution which limits 
the courts to hearing only "cases and controversies. "151 The Supreme 
Court has fashioned a two-part test for standing: 1) the plaintiff must 
have suffered an injury in fact; and 2) the injury must be within the 
zone of interests protected by the allegedly violated statute. 152 
The I P P L appellate court found that neither the financial nor non-
financial injuries the organizations allegedly sufferred satisfied the 
injury in fact requirement. 153 First, the mere fact that the organi-
research under a federal program. See Taub v. State, 296 Md. 439, 440, 463 A.2d 819, 820 
(1983). 
146 The primates were used in experimentation where researchers were studying the mon-
keys' ability to learn to use a limb after nerves had been severed. IPPL, 799 F.2d at 936. 
147 Id. 
14R Id. at 937. 
149 Id. at 938--:39. 
150 Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 731 (1972). 
151 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; see also, Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,204 (1962) (the question 
of standing focuses on whether the party bringing the action has alleged such a personal stake 
in the outcome of the controversy to assure concrete adverseness which sharpens the pres-
entation of issues); Brilmayer, The Jurisprudence of Article III: Perspectives on the "CaBe or 
Controversy" Requirement, 93 HARV. L. REV. 297, 300 (1979) (the case and controversy 
requirement has been understood as establishing that federal courts can only resolve abstract 
legal issues when they are the "necessary byproduct" of the resolution of individual disputes). 
152 Association of Data Processing Service Organizations v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152-53 
(1970); Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 164 (1970). 
153 International Primate Protection League v. Institute for Behavioral Research, 799 F.2d 
934, 938 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S.Ct. 1624, reh'g denied, 107 S.Ct. 2492 (1987). The 
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zations were taxpayers whose money was used to fund the 
institute l54 did not afford them standing to enforce the AWA provi-
sions. 155 Second, funds volunteered by the organizations to maintain 
the monkeys once they had been confiscated also did not amount to 
a "personal stake in the outcome" sufficient to grant the organiza-
tions standing. 156 
The court also rejected the organizations' arguments that their 
non-financial injuries constituted injury in fact. First, the court con-
cluded that the organizations' special interest in the humane care 
and treatment of laboratory animals was precisely the type of injury 
not recognized as an injury in fact. 157 Second, the I P P L court also 
rejected the organizations' contention that their direct and personal 
interaction with the abused primates constituted an injury in fact. 158 
The court stressed that the organizations only came into contact 
with the monkeys through the litigation proceedings. 159 
This limited view of the organizations' personal contact with the 
primates is inaccurate. A member of one plaintiff organization, 
PETA, became acquainted with the primates as a volunteer at 
IBR.160 Thus, the organizations' personal relationship with the pri-
mates originated prior to the litigation. 161 This volunteer's contact 
with the primates instigated the litigation. 162 
IPPL court cited Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91 (1979), for the 
proposition that the plaintiffs have to allege that they suffered or were threatened with 
personal injury as a result of the defendant's putatively illegal conduct in order to have 
standing. Gladstone, 441 U.S. at 99. 
154 The National Institutes of Health (NIH), a federal agency, funded the IBR research. 
IPPL, 799 F.2d at 937. 
155Id. (citing United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 174-75 (1974), for the proposition 
that the payment of taxes does not purchase the authority to enforce regulations). 
156Id. at 938 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 204); but cf. Mutilated Monkeys, supra 
note 6, at 104-05 (funds to maintain the monkeys were volunteered before the suit and 
therefore the IPPL court concluded erroneously that the economic harm the organizations 
sufferred was only a response to the contested conduct and not part of that conduct). 
157Id. (citing Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 735 n.8 (1972)). The Sierra Club Court 
stated "'a mere interest in a problem,' no matter how longstanding the interest and no matter 
how qualified the organization is in evaluating the problem, is not sufficient by itself" to 
establish standing. Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 739. 
158 IPPL, 799 F.2d at 938. 
159 I d. The court analogized the plaintiffs' situation to that of the plaintiff organization in 
Animal Lovers Volunteer Association v. Weinberger, 765 F.2d 937 (9th Cir. 1985), where the 
court found that the plaintiff association suffered no injury in fact because its members lacked 
personal contact with goats being shot on a federal enclave and therefore did not have standing 
to sue. 
160 The volunteer, Alex Pacheco, founded PETA and served on the board of directors. IPPL, 
799 F. Supp. at 936. 
161 Mutilated Monkeys, supra note 6, at 1106. 
162 IPPL, 799 F.2d at 936. 
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Consequently, the district and appellate court decisions in IPPL 
appear to be inconsistent with prior decisions. The organizations 
cited several cases to support this contention. First, in Sierra Club 
v. Morton, 163 the plaintiffs' failure to allege a direct, personal harm 
of the type asserted in I P P L was fatal to their claim. 164 The language 
of the Sierra Club Court suggests that if a personal harm had been 
alleged, the plaintiff organization would have established standing 
to sue. 165 
The organizations also cited Animal Welfare Institute v. Kreps, 166 
where an organization had standing to sue even though only two or 
three of its members were personally aggrieved. 167 The Kreps deci-
sion is consistent with the Supreme Court's decision in United States 
v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures 
(SCRAP).168 In SCRAP, the Court emphasized that the injury in 
fact requirement is satisfied when a plaintiff alleges "specific and 
perceptible harm," regardless of degree. 169 Accordingly, even though 
the majority of the organizations in IPPL did not come in contact 
163 405 U.S. 727 (1972). 
104 [d. at 734-35. 
165 "We do not question that this type of harm [aesthetic and environmental] may amount 
to an 'injury in fact' sufficient to lay the basis for standing under § 10 of the APA .... But 
the 'injury in fact' test requires ... that the party seeking review be himself among the 
injured." [d. 
166 561 F.2d 1002 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
167 [d. at 1007. The Kreps court stated: "It is well settled that an organization may have 
standing to sue as the representative of its members or anyone of them. Appellants have 
satisfied this requirement by alleging injury to the recreational, aesthetic, scientific, and 
educational interests of their members." [d. The organizations, in their brief, also stated: 
"Appellees make much of the fact that appellants' affidavits describe only two mem-
bers who have traveled to South Africa to view the seals in the past, and one who 
plans to do so in the future. But it is well settled that standing does not depend on 
the size or quantum of harm to the party. The Supreme Court has stated, 'The 
association must allege that its members, or anyone of them, are suffering immediate 
or threatened injury as a result of the challenged action. '" 
Reply Brief for Appellants at 24, International Primate Protection League v. Institute for 
Behavioral Research, 799 F.2d 934 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S.Ct. 1624, reh'g denied, 
107 S.Ct. 2492 (1987) (No. 86-1508) [hereinafter Reply BriefJ (quoting Kreps, 561 F.2d at 1008, 
quoting Warth V. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 511 (1975». 
Though the [PPL organizations did not cite this case in their brief, American Horse 
Protection Ass'n. V. Frizzel, 403 F. Supp. 1206 (D. Nev. 1975) also supports their contention. 
Only one member of the plaintiff organization viewed the horses that were to be rounded-up; 
however, the court found the fact that one member was personally aggrieved sufficient to 
confer standing on the plaintiff organization. [d. at 1214. 
168 412 U.S. 669 (1973). 
169 [d. at 689. Whether a person is "adversely affected" or "aggrieved" distinguishes a 
person with a direct stake in the litigation-even though small-from a person with a mere 
interest in the problem. [d. at 689 n.14. 
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with the monkeys until after the litigation was commenced, at least 
a member of one organization had contact prior to the litigation; 
therefore, ,that organization should have had standing. Despite de-
termining that the organizations lacked standing to sue in this in-
stance, the IPPL court proceeded to address whether the organi-
zations had a right to seek judicial relief. 170 
B. Implied Cause of Action 
The statutory authorization of a private cause of action does not 
have to be explicit; rather, it can be implied from the statute.171 The 
primary inquiry regarding whether an implied cause of action exists 
focuses on whether the language and history of the statute allegedly 
violated evinces a congressional intent to create such relief. 172 
The IPPL court found that the appellants were not entitled to 
judicial relief because there was no implied cause of action under 
AWA.173 The court pointed out that AW A's language174 and legisla-
tive history175 reveal a congressional intent to provide for exclusive 
administrative enforcement,176 in order to prevent unnecessary and 
damaging interference with medical research. 177 The "comprehen-
170 IPPL, 799 F.2d at 938-39. 
171 See, e.g., Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1974). There, the Supreme Court employed a four-
part test to determine whether a statute creates an implied private cause of action: 1) the 
plaintiff must be a member of the class for whose benefit the statute was enacted; 2) the 
legislature must have intended such a remedy to exist; 3) a private cause of action must be 
consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme; and 4) the subject matter 
must not be traditionally relegated to state law. Id. at 78. 
l72 See Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979). If there is no congressional 
intent to create a private right of action, the Cort inquiry need not be pursued any further. 
Id. at 575-76. 
173 IPPL, 799 F.2d at 938-40. 
174Id. at 938-39 (quoting 7 U.S.C. § 2143(a)). The court noted that AWA "directs the 
Secretary of Agriculture to 'promulgate standards to govern the humane handling, care, 
treatment, and transportation of animals,' but cautions that 'nothing in this chapter shall be 
construed as authorizing the Secretary to promulgate rules, regulations, or orders with regard 
to design, outlines, guidelines, or performance of actual research or experimentation .... '" 
Id. at 939. ISLAA, however, changed this provision and now allows "the Secretary to pro-
mulgate rules, regulations, or orders with regard to the performance of actual research or 
experimentation by a research facility as determined by such research facility; and shall 
authorize the Secretary, during inspection, to interrupt the conduct of actual research or 
experimentation." 7 U.S.C. § 2143(a)(3)(A) (Supp. IV 1986). 
175 See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 99-447, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1985 U.S. CODE 
CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 1676, 2518. 
176 IPPL, 799 F.2d at 940 (citing Northwest Airlines, Inc. V. Transport Workers, 451 U.S. 
77, 93-94 (1981)); but cf. Mutilated Monkeys, supra note 6, at 107-08 (arguing that AWA 
provi"ions can be interpreted to provide a private cause of action). 
177 The court stated that allowing a private cause of action under AWA might result in 
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sive" regulatory scheme utilizing administrative enforcement to en-
sure compliance was, in the court's view, the only enforcement mech-
anism that Congress envisioned when it enacted AWA.178 
Accordingly, the court rejected the organizations' arguments to im-
ply a private cause of action under A WA. 
The IPPL case was decided under pre-ISLAA AWA.179 Even 
though congressional intent regarding the purpose of the Act180 and 
the amount of allowable interference with research and 
experimentation181 were altered by ISLAA, the IPPL court would 
probably reach the same decision today-that the Act does not create 
impliedly a private cause of action. 182 ISLAA provides the frame-
work for a more pervasive and precisely defined regulatory scheme. 
Under ISLAA, the IACUC is the primary enforcement mechanism 
backed by the authority of USDA.183 ISLAA's legislative history 
reveals that Congress intended the Secretary of Agriculture to con-
tinue to be the exclusive enforcer of the Act. 184 
IPPL indicates that a private cause of action is not a viable en-
forcement alternative. Even if the IPPL organizations had standing 
to sue, they would have been denied injunctive relief because no 
private cause of action is available under AWA. Furthermore, the 
fact that the plaintiffs in the I P P L case arguably had standing to 
sue is an uncommon occurrence. Most research facilities do not have 
members of animal welfare organizations working within their con-
judges and juries with limited knowledge of medical research failing to provide consistent 
decisions on which researchers could rely. In addition, subjecting research facilities to exten-
sive pre-trial discovery of their practices, beyond the administrative inspections of such 
practices already designated in AWA, would seriously burden medical research. IPPL, 799 
F.2d at 940. 
17H [d. (citing Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 
U.S. 1, 15 (1981)). In the absence of strong indicia of contrary congressional intent, the court 
concluded that the remedies provided by Congress were precisely those it considered appro-
priate. Id. 
179 This case was decided in September, 1986, three months before ISLAA became effective. 
See 7 U.S.C. § 2131 (Supp. IV 1986) listing December 23, 1986 as the effective date. 
ISO See supra note 140 and accompanying text. 
IHl See supra note 174. 
182 IPPL, 799 F.2d at 939 n.4 and accompanying text (the use of IACUCs to supplement 
USDA enforcement mandated by ISLAA does not alter the fact that A WA provides for 
exclusive administrative enforcement). 
183 See 7 U.S.C. § 2143 (Supp. IV 1986). 
184 See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 447, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 592-98 reprinted in 1985 U.S. 
CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 1103, 2524 ("The Conferees expect the Secretary of Agriculture 
to have full responsibility for enforcement of the Animal Welfare Act."); cf. Humane Society 
of Rochester and Monroe County, Inc. V. Lyng, 633 F. Supp. 480 (W.D.N.Y. 1986) (New York 
law authorizes the Humane Society to prosecute animal cruelty law violations). 
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fines. Consequently, laboratory animals rarely come into contact 
with individuals sympathetic to their conditions. Thus, injury in fact 
would be difficult if not impossible to prove. Without the requisite 
contact necessary to render one personally aggrieved or adversely 
affected, standing is not attainable. Realizing that private enforce-
ment of AW A's provisions is not a viable conceptl85 leads one back 
to legislation186 as the most practical and expedient means for ob-
taining increased protection of laboratory animals under A WA. 
VI. THE PROPOSED RULES: A PROMISING STEP TOWARD 
EFFECTIVE REGULATION 
ISLAA, coupled with the Proposed Rules, possesses the potential 
to transform the once "toothless" A WA into an effective regulatory 
device. Despite the outcry from the medical research community 
claiming that USDA should propose new, less burdensome regula-
tions to comply with ISLAA's language and congressional intent, 
the fact remains that the primary purpose of ISLAA was to "improve 
the authority of the Secretary of Agriculture to insure the proper 
care and treatment of animals used in research. "187 Recognizing the 
need to preserve responsible and necessary research, Congress spe-
cifically set forth those "general areas" in which the Secretary could 
promulgate regulations limiting the conduct of research and experi-
mentation. 188 
185 See IPPL: 
To imply a cause of action in these plaintiffs might entail serious consequences. It 
might open the use of animals in biomedical research to the vicissitudes of courtroom 
litigation. . . . It might unleash a spate of private lawsuits that would impede ad-
vances made by medical science in the alleviation of human suffering. To risk con-
sequences of this magnitude in the absence of clear direction from the Congress 
would be ill-advised. 
799 F.2d at 935. 
186 Currently there are a number of pending bills in Congress designed to protect laboratory 
animals. For example, H.R. 1708 sponsored by Rep. Torricelli (D-NJ), proposes the enactment 
of a "Research Accountability and Information Dissemination Act" that would establish a 
national center where full-text literature searches would be conducted before research utilizing 
live animals would receive funding. A second bill, H.R. 1770 sponsored by Rep. Rose (D-NC) 
proposes that AWA be amended to allow private individuals to sue USDA to compel enforce-
ment of the Act. See CHUs Legislative Update, ACT'IONLINE, (published by Friends of 
Animals) Feb'/Mar. 1988, at 29-30; see also Dukes, supra note 6, at 538-39 (describing the 
benefits of legislation authorizing citizen suits to compel USDA enforcement of AWA). 
187 H. R. CONF. REP. No. 447, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 592, 594 reprinted in 1985 U.S. CODE 
CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 2518, 2520. 
188 Id. 
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A. Breadth of the Regulatory Scheme 
The Proposed Rules appear to be consistent with ISLAA's man-
date. ISLAA section 2143(a)(6),189 upon which NABR relied to sup-
port its conclusion that the Proposed Rules are too expansive and 
exceed congressional intent,190 only precludes the Secretary from 
interfering with research outside of the "general areas" identified in 
ISLAA as open to regulation. l9l NABR, however, concluded that 
these "general areas" are in fact "very limited exceptions" and were 
intended to maintain researcher autonomy. 192 
In reality, the Secretary's authority to promulgate regulations 
within these "very limited exceptions" is quite broad. For example, 
ISLAA directs the Secretary to promulgate regulations pertaining 
to experimental procedures to ensure that: 1) "animal pain and dis-
tress are minimized;"193 2) alternatives to "any procedure likely to 
produce pain" are considered;194 and 3) certain measures are taken 
"in any practice which could cause pain to animals. "195 ISLAA also 
requires research facilities to provide "assurances satisfactory to the 
Secretary that such facility is adhering to the standards described 
in this section. "196 Such sweeping language is indicative of a congres-
sional willingness to allow the Secretary to exercise his or her dis-
cretion in determining, for instance, which protocols must meet 
certain standards and what information the facilities must present 
in their annual reports to substantiate their compliance with the Act. 
Thus, ISLAA's comprehensiveness belies NABR's objections that 
the Proposed Rules exceed congressional intent. 
The research community's objections are hardly surprising. The 
Proposed Rules' imposition of substantive restrictions on the re-
search process strikes at the very heart of the controversy between 
the research community seeking scientific autonomy and the animal 
welfare organizations seeking research regulation. 197 Research com-
munity opposition to ISLAA, which for the first time authorized the 
Secretary to impose substantive restrictions on the experimentation 
189 7 U.S.C. § 2143(a)(6) (Supp. IV 1986). 
190 See supra notes 113-15 and accompanying text. 
191 7 U.S.C. §§ 2143(a)(3) and (7) (Supp. IV 1986), define those areas in which the Secretary 
is required to promulgate regulations governing the experimentation process. 
192 See NABR Comments, supra note 13, at 125. 
193 7 U.S.C. § 2143(a)(3)(A) (Supp. IV 1986). 
194Id. § 2143(a)(3)(B). 
195Id. § 2143(a)(3)(C). 
196Id. § 2143(a)(7). 
197 See Dresser, supra note 6, at 1194. 
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process, was inevitable. 198 Given that prior to ISLAA experimen-
tation was virtually unregulated199 and existing AWA regulations 
were inadequately enforced,20o the substantial step taken by USDA 
in drafting the Proposed Rules was necessary to establish parity 
between the competing interests. 
B. The IAGUG's Internal Review Process 
USDA's Proposed Rules evince a more accepting agency attitude 
toward its AWA enforcement responsibility.201 The formation of IA-
CUCs to provide internal review lifts a tremendous burden from 
APHIS personnel assigned the formidable task of enforcing AW A's 
provisions. The IACUCs alleviate many of the problems faced pre-
viously by APHIS202 by allowing for qualified personnel to review 
actively individual facility compliance on a regular basis. APHIS is 
effectively removed from its former position as the "front-line" en-
forcer of AWA. Instead, APHIS becomes the support base for the 
Committees, providing the necessary authority to persuade research 
facilities to cooperate with the IACUCs. 
Despite NABR's claim that Committees are granted too much 
authority to carry out regulatory enforcement,203 the IACUCs ap-
pear to be a commendable attempt to achieve a delicate balance 
between increasing animal protection and preserving essential 
biomedical research. IACUCs should be given an opportunity to 
operate under the terms of the Proposed Rules before any major 
revisions of Committee composition and duties are implemented. 
Unfounded fears on either side should not be allowed to dictate 
changes in regulations that have not yet been tested in their current 
form. 
The creation of IACUCs mandated by ISLAA allows at least one 
objective observer at each research facility to review and voice an 
opinion on the various pain-inflicting protocols being utilized. 204 From 
an animal welfare perspective, however, there are some potential 
problems with the current Committee formation procedures and 
composition that should be addressed if the need arises. The ALDF 
198 I d. at 1195. 
199 See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
200 See supra notes 45--54 and accompanying text. 
201 See supra note 88 and accompanying text. 
202 See supra notes 45--54 and accompanying text. 
203 See supra note 123 and accompanying text. 
204 See supra note 75 and accompanying text. 
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Comments on the Proposed Rules identify some of these trouble 
spotS. 205 
First, ALDF suggested that the outside or non-affiliated Com-
mittee members be selected via a formal review of qualified 
applicants206 instead of being appointed by the chief executive officer 
(CEO) of each research facility as ISLAA now requires. 207 ALDF's 
suggestion would insure the objectivity of the non-affiliated member. 
The possibility exists that objectivity would be jeopardized if the 
outside member was chosen by a CEO to place simply a rubber 
stamp of approval on research protocols without adequate consid-
eration of the pain being inflicted on animal subjects, the necessity 
of the research, and the availability of alternatives. 
Second, ALDF was concerned that research facilities will appoint 
other researchers, not affiliated with their own facility, as non-affil-
iated Committee members.208 In the absence of a formal selection 
process, research facilities should not be permitted to appoint outside 
members who may be naturally biased toward the researchers' 
views. This practice, if utilized, violates ISLAA's requirement that 
the non-affiliated member "provide[s] representation for general 
community interests in the proper care and treatment of animals. "209 
Third, ALDF proposed that the number of outside members on 
each IACUC be proportionate to the total number of Committee 
members. 210 A WA places no ceiling on the number of Committee 
members a CEO can appoint.211 The possibility exists that a large 
majority of Committee members could apply pressure on an outside 
member to reach assessments of protocols consistent with their own, 
thereby stifling objective analysis. Maintaining a one-to-three ratio 
of outside members to the total number of Committee members 
would help to preserve the minority opinion. 
Another troubling aspect of the IACUCs is that ISLAA and the 
Proposed Rules do not designate a specific removal mechanism for 
Committee members. There is a danger that if a research facility 
views a Committee member as being hostile to its interests, the 
205 See supra notes 132-37 and accompanying text. 
206 See supra note 136 (ALDF did not specify who should do the reviewing or what the 
exact criteria should be for choosing the outside member). 
207 7 U.S.C. § 2143(b)(1) (Supp. IV 1986). 
208 See ALDF Comments, supra note 129, at 16. 
209 [d. (emphasis added). It came to ALDF's attention that some research facilities have 
selected outside members who are researchers from other facilities. [d. at 16. 
210 [d. at 15. 
211 7 U.S.C. § 2143(b)(1) (Supp. IV 1986); ALDF Comments, supra note 129, at 15 (some 
larger research facilities have 10-15 Committee members). 
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facility could dismiss that member, even though the Committee 
member's complaints may be well-founded. Research facilities should 
not be able to avoid legitimate opposition by dismissing members 
who offer constructive criticism and replacing them with less antag-
onistic candidates. If dismissals become too frequent, USDA should 
establish a review board that would listen to the grievances of both 
the facility and the Committee member before determining whether 
dismissal is appropriate. . 
Whether any of these corrective measures will be necessary de-
pends on the willingness of research facilities to accept the Commit-
tees' regulatory responsibilities under AWA. Cooperation is the es-
sential ingredient if the Act is to serve the interests of both the 
animal welfare and research communities. If researchers perceive 
the IACUCs as opponents rather than allies and attempt to circum-
vent the regulatory system established by ISLAA, not only will 
stricter controls be in order, but researchers will also jeopardize 
vital research and experimentation by inviting retaliation from mil-
itant anti-vivisectionist organizations such as the Animal Liberation 
Front. 212 
VII. CONCLUSION 
ISLAA embodies the first major effort to strike a statutory bal-
ance between biomedical research and the humane treatment of 
laboratory animals. Twenty-two years after LAWA was first en-
acted, animal welfare organizations finally have reason to be opti-
mistic that the needless infliction of pain on animals behind labora-
tory doors will not be insulated from scrutiny. Congress, along with 
the rest of society, has become increasingly aware of the suffering 
experienced by animal subjects and has taken a significant step 
toward eliminating unnecessary animal experimentation. 213 
212 See Antinomy, supra note 6, at 750-51 n.184 for a brief synopsis of some Animal 
Liberation Front operations; see also Inhuman Bondage, supra note 1, for a description of 
ALF covert activities from the perspective of ALF members. 
213 Compare the main purpose of ISLAA discussed in the text supra at notes 60-61, with 
the commentary of Senator Monroney during the enactment of LAWA in 1966: 
Let me make it crystal clear that this bill in no way will impair the rights of 
researchers and the managers of research facilities to subject animals to medical or 
surgical procedures required for research and experimentation .... The researcher 
is left completely free to use an animal in his research project in whatever way, no 
matter how painful, and for as long as he deems necessary, including removing any 
organs or vital parts, or even experimentation that he knows will result in the death 
of the animal. 
112 CONGo REC. S13,893 (June 22, 1966) (statement of Sen. Monroney). 
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By design, the early AWA legislation was impotent to prevent 
abusive animal research. ISLAA and the Proposed Rules remedy 
this substantive deficiency by establishing the regulation of research 
procedures. 
The inability of animal rights organizations to obtain standing to 
sue, coupled with clear congressional intent to preclude private en-
forcement of the Act, emphasize the need for a comprehensive reg-
ulatory scheme to insure compliance with AW A's provisions. The 
regulatory scheme outlined in ISLAA and detailed in the Proposed 
Rules, utilizing the Committees as the primary enforcement mech-
anism, possesses the potential to revitalize the Act. After experi-
encing years of enforcement difficulties, APHIS is well aware of 
what the regulations must entail in order to enforce properly AWA 
in its present form. Accordingly, it is hoped that in drafting its final 
regulations USDA will address any legitimate concerns regarding 
the Proposed Rules, without compromising those provisions which 
will make effective enforcement of AWA a reality. 
